in view of their much more fortunate position in regard to material of war, are bound to do everything that is humanly possible, and even at some sacrifice to themselves, to redress this great inequality."

When I come to the chapter on the Revolution I shall deal more fully with the effect on the Russian mind of our imprudent stinginess in the matter of sharing supplies.

In pressing for the consideration of some real measure of resource-pooling, the Russians urged *Gourko* again and again their interesting practical *proposes a* suggestion, that account should be taken " *minimum* of the *minimum requirements* necessary to *equipment* enable an army to carry out the operations expected from it. General Gourko said in his address :—

" The Russian Army cannot carry out successfully an offensive action on a wide front until it possesses an agreed minimum of technical equipment. . . . It hopes that the Allied Governments will, on behalf of our common aim of victory, find means to furnish the Russian Army with what it lacks. Only on this condition can it bring to bear its whole weight against the adversary. It goes without saying that if the minimum in question can be exceeded, the hour of final success would be brought much nearer."

The proposition he lays down is unchallengeable ; and had it been discussed in a friendly manner between the Allies in 1914 or even in 1915, and accepted and acted upon as a cardinal principle of